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Stone v. Powell and the Effective Assistance of Counsel
Since Stone v. Powell, 1 state prisoners who have been afforded
"an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a fourth amendment
claimt__may_not .obtain federal habeas corpus relief on the basis of
that claim.2 Courts3 ancrcommentators4 have frequently speculated
about the applicability of Stone to other constitutional claims, but
most courts have rejected proposals to extend its holding to cases not
involving the fourth amendment exclusionary rule. 5 Disagreements
have arisen, however, among courts that have considered sixth
I. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
2. 428 U.S. at 494. Authority to review petitions for habeas corpus in federal court was
expressly granted by Congress. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976). Section 2254(a) provides:
The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall ·entertain
an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the
judgment of a state court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.
In Ex parle Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 202-03 (1830), the Supreme Court held that the
scope of§ 2254's predecessor statute was limited to attacks on the jurisdiction of the court that
confined the habeas petitioner. For a variety of perspectives on the writ's subsequent expansion, see Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Copus far Stale Prisoners, 16
HAR.v. L. REv. 441, 463-99 (1963); Brennan, Federal Habeas Copus and Stale Prisoners: An
Exercise in Federalism, 1 UTAH L. REv. 423 (1961); Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral A/lack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 142, 151-57 (1970); Hart, Foreword:
'llze Time Chari ofthe Justices 'I7ze Supreme Court, 19.58 Term, 13 HARV. L. REV. 84, 101-22
(1959); Oaks, Legal History in the High Court- /fabeas Copus, 64 MICH. L. REv. 451 (1966);
Reitz,FederalHabeasCopus: ImpactofanAbortiveStateProceeding, 74HARV. L. REv. 131S,
1354-57 (1961); .Developments in the Law- Federal Habeas Copus, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1038,
1042-72 (1970).
Stone provoked an extensive and generally critical reaction in the literature. See, e.g.,
Boyte, Federal Habeas CopusAfler Stone v. Powell: A Remedy Only For The Arguably Innocent?, 11 U. RICH. L. REv. 291 (1977); Green, Stone v. Powell: The Hermeneutics ofthe Burger
Court, IO CREIGHTON L. REv. 655 (1977); Robbins & Sanders, Judicial Integrity, the Appearance ofJustice, and the Great Writ ofHabeas Cop/I!: How lo Kill 1wo Thirds (or More) With
One Stone, IS AM. CRIM. L. REv. 63 (1977).
3. See Browder v. Department of Corrections, 434 U.S. 257, 258-59 n.1 (1978); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 n.11 (1977); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 414 (1977)
(Powell, J., concurring); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, S06-15 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
4. See, e.g., Cover & Aleinikoff, .Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Copus and the Court, 86
YALE LJ. 1035, 1086-100 (1977); Schulhofer, Coefesslons and the Court, 19 MICH. L. REv. 865,
887-91 (1981); Tague, Federal Habeas Copus and Ineffective Representation of Counsel: The
Supreme Court Has Work lo .Do, 31 STAN. L. REv. I, 29 n.141 (1978).
S. See Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979);
Sallie v. North Carolina, 587 F.2d 636 (4th Cir. 1978); Wilson v. Henderson, 584 F.2d 1185 (2d
Cir. 1978); United States ex rel Henne v. Fike, 563 F.2d 809 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1072 (1978); Greene v. Massey, S46 F.2d 51 (5th Cir. 1977); United States ex rel Hudson
v. Warden, No. 74-C-2392 (N.D. ID. June 30, 1981); Toliver v. Wyrick, 469 F. Supp. S83 (W.D.
Mo. 1979) (dictum); Sedgewick v. Superior Court, 417 F. Supp. 386 (D.D.C. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1075 (1979); cf. Hussong v. Warden, 623 F.2d I 185 (7th Cir. 1980) (Stone inapplicable to exclusionary rule imposed by federal wiretapping statute). But see Richardson v.
Stone, 421 F. Supp. S77 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (Stone applies to Miranda claims).
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amendment claims of ineffective assistance of counsel6 based on an
attorney's failure to raise or incompetent presentation of a fourth
amendment issue in pretrial proceedings or at trial. Although ineffective assistance claims are generally cognizable in habeas corpus
proceedings,7 at least one court has applied Stone and denied relief
when the alleged incompetence involved a fourth amendm~nt issue. 8
Other courts have distinguished these sixth amendment claims from
the fourth amendment issue presented in Stone and thus have sanctioned habeas corpus relief. 9
This Note supports the latter view: Courts should not invoke
6. See note 62 i'!fra.
7. See, e.g., Cuylerv. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980); Barnes v. Jones, 665 F.2d 427 (2d Cir.
1981); Eldridge v. Atkins, 665 F.2d 228 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3780 (Mar.
30, 1982); Perez v. Wainwright, 640 F.2d 596 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3780
(Mar. 30, 1982). But cf. Bines, Remedying Ineffective Representation In Criminal Cases: Departures From Habeas Corpus, 59 VA. L. R.Ev. 927, 970-83 (1973) (proposing alternative remedies
for ineffective counsel, obviating justification for habeas corpus).
8. See Sallie v. North Carolina, 587 F.2d 636, 641 (4th Cir. 1978) (Chapman, J., concurring in result) (dictum); LiPuma v. Commissioner, Dept. of Corrections, New York, 560 F.2d
84, 93 n.6 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 861 (1978); Allah v. Henderson, 526 F. Supp.
282 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). See generally Bines, supra note 7, at 976. In addition, the Ninth Circuit
recently indicated that it considers the issue open and may soon resolve it. See Moran v.
Morris, 665 F.2d 900 (9th Cir. 1981).
9. See Sallie v. North Carolina, 587 F.2d 636, 640-41 (4th Cir. 1978); Moran v. Morris, 478
F. Supp. 145, 151 (C.D. Cal. 1979), vacated on other grounds, 665 F.2d 900 (9th Cir. 1981).
The failure of a prisoner's attorney to raise a fourth amendment claim in a manner prescribed by state procedural rules imposes an additional obstacle to federal habeas review on
that ground. In Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977), the Supreme Court held that a state
procedural default bars federal habeas corpus absent a showing of "cause" for the violation
and resulting prejudice to the defendant. 433 U.S. at 90-91. The Supreme Court has offered
little guidance as to what "cause" will entitle a defendant to federal collateral review, see
Engle v. Isaac, 50 U.S.L.W. 4376, 4386 (U.S. Apr. 5, 1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 91, and the lower federal courts have struggled with the issue. See
generally Goodman & Sallett, Wainwright v. Sykes: The Lower Federal Courts Respond, 30
HAsT. LJ. 1683 (1979).
Several habeas petitioners have argue!,l that attorney ineffectiveness should constitute
"cause." While the Fifth Circuit has held that unsubstantiated allegations of counsel incompetence are insufficient, see Washington v. Estelle, 648 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1981); Tyler v. Phelps,
643 F.2d 1095 (5th Cir. 1981), other courts have found that "cause exists when the record
reveals attorney error affecting substantial constitutional rights of the defendant." United
States v. Brown, No. 77-2106, slip op. at 11 (D.C. Cir. March 21, 1980). See Boyer v. Patton,
579 F.2d 284, 288 (3d Cir. 1978); Sincox v. United States, 571 F.2d 876, 880 (5th Cir. 1978);
Rinehart v. Brewer, 561 F.2d 126, 130 n.6 (8th Cir. 1977); Tolliver v. Wyrick, 469 F. Supp. 583,
602 (W.D. Mo. 1979) (alternative holding); The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HAR.v. L. R.Ev.
70, 214 (1977); cf. Note,Attomey Ellor as "Cause" Under Wainwright v. Sykes: The Casefor a
Reasonableness Standard after Washington v. Downes, 67 VA. L. REv. 415 (1981) (attorney
error need not breach constitutional standard to constitute "cause"); see also Fay v. Noia, 372
U.S. 391, 470-71 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (acknowledging importance of competent
counsel to adequacy of state procedural ground). But see Gates v. Henderson, 568 F.2d 830,
843 n.6 (2d Cir. 1977) (en bane) (Oakes, J., concurring). This view finds apparent support in
the Supreme Court's recent application of Wainwright in Engle v. Isaac, 50 U.S.L.W. 4376
(U.S. Apr. 5, 1982). Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, noted that while alleged unawareness of a constitutional objection is not excusable cause for a procedural default, the
Constitution guarantees "a fair trial and a competent attorney." 50 U.S.L.W. at 4383 (emphasis added). Moreover, the Engle court asserted that victims of a "fundamental miscarriage of
justice" would be able to meet the cause and prejudice standard, citing Justice Stevens' concur-
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Stone's bar of habeas corpus relief against a prisoner whose ineffective assistance of counsel claim is evidenced by his attorney's mishandling of a fourth amendment issue. Part I briefly identifies the
considerations underlying the Stone Court's decision to limit habeas
corpus review of fourth amendment claims. Part II then argues
against applying Stone to the sixth amendment claim. After establishing the analytic di.fference between the two constitutional claims
and examininB Stone's "opportunity for full and fair litigation" standard, it concludes that Stone is fully consistent with free review of
habeas corpus petitions alleging incompetent handling of fourth
amendment questions. Finally, responding to a popular interpretation of Stone, Part II demonstrates that the possibility that ineffectiveness claims may not further the determination of a defendant's
factual guilt or innocence should not preclude their review in habeas
corpus proceedings.

I. THE UNDERPINNINGS OF STONE V. Po WELL
Lloyd Powell was convicted of murder after the Califomia courts
denied his motion to suppress evidence obtained in an allegedly unconstitutional search. 10 In his petition for a federal writ of habeas
corpus, Powell argued that the evidence should have been excluded.11 The district court denied the writ, but the Ninth Circuit
disagreed, holding that because the statute under which Powell was
arrested and searched was unconstitutionally vague, the evidence obtained was inadmissible. 12 In Stone v. Powell, 13 the Supreme Court
reversed. It held that habeas corpus relief was not available since the
state had given the defendant an "opportunity for full and fair litigation" of his fourth amendment claims. 14
ring opinion in Wainwright, 50 U.S.L.W. at 4383. Justice Stevens, in several passages, recognized the importance of counsel competence. 433 U.S. at 94-97 (Stevens, J., concurring).
This Note contends that fourth amendment claims and sixth amendment claims evidenced
by fourth amendment errors are distinct; the Wainwright issue is separate and beyond the
scope of this Note. Indeed, one commentator has concluded that Wainwright is likely to lead
habeas petitioners to challenge counsel competence on sixth amendment grounds rather than
raise other substantive claims now barred. See Tague, Federal Habeas Corpus and Ineffective
Representation of Counsel· The Supreme Court Has Work To Po, 31 STAN. L. REV. I (1978).
10. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 470 (1976).
I I. See 428 U.S. at 470.
12. See 428 U.S. at 470-71. The Ninth Circuit's opinion is reported at 507 F.2d 93 (1974).
13. 428 U.S. 465 (1976). Stone was decided together with Wo!!f v. Rice. Rice was convicted of murder in a Nebraska state court after his motion to suppress certain evidence was
denied. See 428 U.S. at 471-72. Rice filed for federal habeas corpus relief, alleging that the
search that uncovered the disputed evidence was illegal. Both the district court and the Eighth
Circuit agreed with Rice, holding the search invalid because the search warrant failed to establish probable cause. 513 F.2d 1280 (8th Cir. 1975); 388 F.Supp. 185, 190-94 (D. Neb. 1974)
(citing Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), and Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108
(1964)). The Supreme Court held that Rice, like Powell, had been afforded an opportunity for
full and fair litigation and reinstated his conviction. 428 U.S. at 496.
14. 428 U.S. at 494.
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Justice Powell, writing for the majority in Stone, initially posited
that criminal defendants have no constitutional right to the exclusion
of evidence acquired in violation of the fourth amendment. 15 The
exclusionary rule, he argued, is a judicial "remedy'' for illegal
searches and seizures 16 that exists primarily to deter violations of the
fourth amendment. 17 In contrast to the rule's effectiveness when invoked at trial and on direct review, 18 excluding evidence on federal
collateral attack is far less likely to deter illegal police activity. 19 The
Court rejected the "dubious assumption that law enforcement authorities would fear that federal habeas review might reveal flaws in
a search or seizure that went undetected at trial and on appeal." 20
After questioning the utility of applying the exclusionary rule in
habeas corpus proceedings, Justice Powell argued that the rule imposes significant societal costs.21 He observed that exch~ded evi15. 428 U.S. at 482-89; see United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974); Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 399, 411 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 661-62 (1961) (Black, J., concurring); Wilkey, The Exclusionary Rule: 'Why
Suppress Valid Evidence?, 62 JUDICATURE 214 (1978). But see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12-13
(1967) ("Courts which sit under our Constitution cannot and will not be made party to lawless
invasion of the constitutional rights of citizens by permitting unhindered governmental use of
the fruits of such invasions."); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651, 657 (1961); Elkins v. United
States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960) (''the imperative of judicial integrity''); Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Kamisar, Is the Exclusionary Rule an
"Illogical" or "Unnatural" Interpretation ofthe Fourth Amendment?, 62 JUDICATURE 66 (1978);
Schrock & Welsh, Up from Calandra: The Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional Requirement,
59 MINN. L. REv. 251 (1974). See generally 1 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SElZURE § 1.1 (1978).
16. 428 U.S. at 486. The victim of the illegal search is not the remedy's beneficiary. The·
exclusionary rule "is not calculated to redress the injury to the privacy of the victim of the
search or seizure, for any '[r)eparation comes too late.'" 428 U.S. at 486 (quoting Linkletter v.
Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 637 (1965)).
17. 428 U.S. at 486. But see United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 557-58 (1975) (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
18. The effect of the exclusionary rule on illegal police activity is a disputed question.
Compare Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary R;ule in Search and Seizure, 31 U. Cm. L. REv. 665
(1970) and Spiotto, Search and Seizure: An Empirical Study of the Exclusionary Rule and its
.Alternatives, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 243 (1973), with Canon, Is the Exclusionary Rule in Failing
Health? Some New .Data and a Plea .Against a Precipitous Conclusion, 62 KY. L.J. 681 (1974),
and Critique, On the Limitations ofEmpirical Evaluations ofthe Exclusionary Rule: A Critique
ofthe Spiotto Research and United States v. Calandra, 69 Nw. U.L. REv. 740 (1974).
19. See 428 U.S. at 494-95. But see Seidman, Factual Guilt and the Burger Court: An Examination of Continuity and Change in Criminal Procedure, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 436, 453 n.104
(1980).
20. 428 U.S. at 493 (footnote omitted). Ignored in the Court's discussion and by many
commentators is the exclusionary rule's symbolic value. See Tiffany, Judicial Atlel11JJIS to Control the Police, 61 CURRENT HlsT. 13, 52 (1971) (In considering whether the Court should
scrap the exclusionary rule ''it may be important to distinguish between the functional and
symbolic impact of a rule designed to control behavior. From a functional perspective, the
Mapp rule may be a failure. It need not follow that the rule should be changed if one can find
, in it sufficient symbolic worth.'').
21. 428 U.S. at 490. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 411 (1971)
(Burger, CJ., dissenting); People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585 (1926) (Cardozo, J.);
Friendly, Is Innocence Illelevant? Collateral.Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. Cm. L. REv.
142, 161 (1970); Wright, Must the Criminal Go Free If the Constable Blunders?, SO TEXAS L.
Rl!v. 736 (1972). But see K. BROSI, A CROSS-9ITY COMPARISON OF FELONY CASE PROCESS-
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dence is generally reliable and often the most probative of a
defendant's guilt or innocence.22 When evidence is excluded, guilty
defendants may go free. The exclusionary rule thus distracts from
the "ultimate question of guilt or innocence that should be the central concern in a criminal proceeding."23 In light of these costs, the
Court has applied the rule only ''where its remedial objectives are
thought most efficaciously served."24 Balancing the costs of imposing the rule against the small increase in deterrence that might result,
the Stone Court limited the power of federal courts to consider
fourth amendment claims on habeas corpus review.
Justice Powell also objected to the breadth of federal habeas
corpus itself.25 Before Stone, state prisoners could obtain full review
of their federal statutory and constitutional claims in a habeas
corpus proceeding.26 Stone created an exception to this broad power
of review; federal habeas courts can reexamine the merits of a fourth
amendment claim only if the state did not afford the defendant an
opportunity for full and fair litigation of that claim.27
The majority grounded its concern with the scope of federal
habeas corpus on four specific policy interests. First, federal habeas
review exacerbates federal-state tension by giving a single federal
judge broad authority to invalidate..decisions
of state courts.28 Sec1
ond, federal habeas review undertllines finality in state criminal trials by prolonging the pursuit of absolute truth. 29 Third, Stone may
ING 18-19 (1979) (cited inY. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 221-22 (5th ed. 1980)); U.S. GAO, REPORT OF THE COMPI'ROLLER GENERAL OF THE
UNITED STATES, IMPACT OF THE ExcLUSIONARY RULE ON FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS (1979).
22. 428 U.S. at 490. But see Tushnet, Judicial Revision oJ the Habeas Corpus Statutes: A
Note on Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 1975 Wis. L. Rev. 484, 496-500.
23. 428 U.S. at 490 (footnote omitted).
24. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (holding that the government may
use illegally seized evidence in grand jury proceedings). See Walder v. United States, 347 U.S.
62 (1954) (illegally seized evidence admissible at subsequent trial to impeach defendant's
testimony).
25. See 428 U.S. at 491 n.31. Justice O'Connor recently articulated many of the arguments
against broad access to federal habeas corpus for state prisoners. See Engle v. Isaac, 50
U.S.L.W. 4376, 4381-82 (U.S. Apr. 5, 1982).
26. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 515-33 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Fay v. Noia,
372 U.S. 391 (1963); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953); 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976); Bator,
supra note 2, at 444; Friendly, supra note 2, at 155; Hart, supra note 2, at 106. See generally
Developments, supra note 2, at 1042-62.
27. 428 U.S. at 494 & n.37.
28. 428 U.S. at 491 n.31. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 263-65 (1973)
(Powell, J., concurring); cf. Wainwright v. Skyes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977) (asserting the need to
make state trials the "main event" in the criminal justice system). But see Chisum, In lJefense
oJModem Federal Habeas Corpusfar State Prisoners, 21 DE PAULL. Rev. 682, 693 (1972);
but cf. Cover & Aleinikoff, JJialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J.
1035 (1977) (describing "dialogue" between utopian federal courts and practical state courts
defining individual rights).
29. 428 U.S. at 491 n.31. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 261-63 (Powell, J.,
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have suggested a narrower purpose for habeas corpus: Justice Powell's opinion indicates that its primary goal may be "to assure that no
innocent person suffers an unconstitutional loss of liberty."3° Finally, the Court was concerned that the prisoner petitions generated
by the availability of full habeas review contributed significantly to
the overcrowding of federal court dockets. 31
Stone, then, rests on two ideas that intersect when a state prisoner
seeks federal habeas corpus relief on fourth amendment grounds a balancing of the costs and benefits of applying the exclusionary
rule in federal habeas proceedings and a concern for the breadth of
federal habeas review generally. Part II addresses whether these
considerations justify extending Stone's rule, to sixth amendment
claims.
II. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN

FOURTH AND SIXTH
AMENDMENT CLAIMS

Habeas corpus petitions alleging that an attorney mishandled a
fourth amendment-claim involve two distinct constitutional violations. The first, an illegal search or seizure, was committed by the
police before the defendant's trial. The second violation, however,
occurred during the trial, when the attorney's incompetence denied
the defendant his sixth amendment right to the effective assistance of
counsel.32 This Part of the Note argues that while the first violation
is covered by Stone, the second is not.
concurring); Bator, supra note 2, at 452-53. But see Lay, Modem Administrative Proposals for
Federal Habeas Corpus: The Rights of Prisoners Preserved, 21 DE PAUL L. REv. 701, 709-10
(1972):
Sober reflection upon why we have devised a system which allows a continual questioning of its processes discloses that our purpose is not so much to remove the discomforting doubt or to achieve the ultimate assurance, as it is to give safeguard to rights not
readily visible or easily acknowledged. . . . We would not send two astronauts to the
moon without providing them with at least three or four back-up systems. Should we
send literally thousands of men to prison with even less reserves? . . . [W]ith knowledge
of our fallibility and a realization of past errors, we can hardly insure our confidence by
creating an irrevocable end to the guilt-determining process.
On the effect of a lack of finality on prisoners' efforts toward rehabilitation, see remarks by
Freund in Symposium: Habeas Corpus-Proposalsfor Reform, 9 UTAH L. REv. 27, 30 (1964);
Schwartz, Retroactivity, Reliability and .Due Process: A Response to· Professor Mishkin, 33 U.
Cm. L. REv. 719, 744 (1966).
30. 428 U.S. at 491 n.31. (emphasis added) See generally Part II C iefra.
31. 428 U.S. at 491 n.31. See Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. at 260-61 (Powell, J.,
concurring); Friendly, supra note 2, at 143-44, 148-51. See generally H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL
JURISDICTION 15-54 (1973); Burger, Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary, 66 A.B.A.J.
295,297 (1980); Burger,Agendafar 2000A..D. -A NeedfarSystematicAnticipation, 70 F.R.D.
83 (1976); Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System (Hruska Commission), Structure and Internal Procedures: Recommendationsfar Change, 61 F.R.D. 195, 394409 (1975); Shapiro, Federal Habeas Corpus: A Study in Massachusetts, 87 HARv. L. REV. 321
(1973).
32. See notes 38-39 i'!fra.
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The Evidentiary Role of Fourth Amendment Violations

At least one court has expressed its unwillingness to find a significant difference beween fourth amendment claims and the sixth
amendment claim that this Note considers. In LiPuma v. Commissioner,33 trial counsel neglected to make a pretrial motion to suppress evidence seized during an allegedly illegal search. When the
motion was made at trial, the state court held it untimely. At his
sentencing, the defendant, represented by different counsel, requested a new trial on the ground that his previous attorney had
acted incompetently. The court denied the motion, and the appellate
court affirmed the conviction without an opinion.34 In federal
habeas corpus proceedings, the prisoner alleged ineffective assistance
of counsel and was granted relief. 35 The Second Circuit applied
Stone and reversed, finding that the state courts' full and fair consideration of the petitioner's sixth amendment claim barred federal collateral relief. 36 Despite the ostensible difference in the claims, Stone
applied because "at the heart of [the] case lies an alleged fourth
amendment violation . . . [to which] a sixth amendment claim has
been added for good measure."37
On close examination, however, the two claims differ significantly. The relevant considerations in ineffectiveness claims are the
seriousness of the attorney's error and the resulting prejudice to the
defendant.38 Courts generally assess these claims by measuring the
attorney's performance against community norms or a standard of
reasonable competence.39 When the allegation of incompetence
33. 560 F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 861 (1978).
34. See 560 F.2d at 88.
35. See United States ex rel Rosner v. Commissioner, New York State Dept. of Corrections, 421 F.Supp. 781 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), revd. sub nom. LiPuma v. Commissioner, Dept. of
Corrections, New York, 560 F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 861 (1978).
36. 560 F.2d at 93 n.6.
37. 560 F.2d at 93 n.6. A district court in the Second Circuit has since rejected the argument that LiPuma should "be limited either to the situation of a less than egregious sixth
amendment violation or a blatant attempt to evade Stone." Allah v. Henderson, 526 F. Supp.
282, 286 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
38. See United States v. Hinton, 631 F.2d 769 (D.C. Cir. 1980); United States v. Decoster,
624 F.2d 196 (D.C. Cir.) (plurality) (en bane), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 944 (1979); Davis v. Alabama, 596 F.2d 1214 (5th Cir. 1979), vacated as moot, 446 U.S. 903 (1980); Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1978) (en bane), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974 (1979); United States v.
Williams, 575 F.2d 388, 393 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 842 (1978); McQueen v. Swenson,
498 F.2d 207 (8th Cir. 1974); Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89,315 N.E.2d 878 (1974).
See generally Note, A Functional Analysis ofthe Effective Assistance of Counsel, 80 CoLUM. L.
REV. 1053 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Columbia Note]; Note, Identifying and Remedying Ineffective Assistance of Criminal Pefanse Counsel· A New Look After United States v. Decoster, 93
HARV. L. REV. 752 (1980).
39. See Dyer v. Crisp, 613 F.2d 275, 278 (10th Cir.) (en bane) ("the skill, judgment and
diligence of a reasonably competent defense attorney"), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 945 (1980);
United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196, 208 (D.C. Cir.) (en bane) (Leventhal, J.) ("the performance ordinarily expected of fallible lawyers"), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 944 (1979); Cooper v.
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rests on the failure to assert a right or defense, courts apply the standard- to determine whether the attorney should reasonably have been
aware of the right or defense and, if so, whether his omission was
justified.4 Failure on either count indicates that the attorney did not
satisfy the constitutional standard of effectiveness.
By relying on StoJ?e and failing to consider the sixth amendment
violation, the LiPuma court mischaracterized the relevance of the
fourth amendment violation. The search and seizure question
should be relevant only as evidence of incompetence, not as an independent basis for habeas relief.41 The question in assessing the attorney's performance should be whether, according to the relevant
standard, a competent lawyer would have made a timely objection.42
Despite several restrictions, the exclusionary rule is undeniably
available at trial and in pretrial proceedings.43 Indeed, Mapp v.

°

Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1328 (9th Cir. 1978) (en bane) (''reasonably competent and effective
assistance of counsel"), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974 (1979); United States v. Bosch, 584 F.2d
1113, 1121 (1st Cir. 1978) ("within the range of competence expected of attorneys in criminal
cases"); United States v. Gray, 565 F.2d 881, 887 (5th Cir.) (''reasonably likely to render and
did render reasonably effective counsel"}, cert. denied, 435 U.S. 955 (1978); Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540, 544-45 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1011 (1978); United States ex
rel Ortiz v. Sielaff, 542 F.2d 377,379 (7th Cir. 1976) (''the minimum standard of professional
representation"); Unted States v. Easter, 539 F.2d 663, 666 (8th Cir. 1976) (''the customary
skills and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would perform under similar circumstances"), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 844 (1977); United States v. Toney, 527 F.2d 716, 720 (6th Cir.
1975) ("reasonably likely to render and does render reasonably effective assistance"), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 838 (1976); Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 736 (3d Cir. 1970) ("exercise
of the customary skill and knowledge which normally prevails at the time and place"). Despite a barrage of scholarly criticism, see, e.g., Bazelon, The Realities of Gideon and
Argersinger, 64 GEO. LJ. 811 (1976); Erickson, Standards of Competencyfar Defense Counsel
in a Criminal Cos~ 17 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 233, 237-39 (1979); F~er, Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel, 58 CORNELL L. REv. 1077 (1973), the Second Circuit requires an attorney's incompetence to make the trial a ''.farce and mockery of justice" to establish a sixth amendment violation. See United States v. Alessi, 638 F.2d 466, 477 (2d Cir. 1980). ~
40. Irrespective of the particular governing standards, courts refuse to second guess tactical
decisions. See United States v. Miller, 643 F.2d 713, 714 (10th Cir.,1981); United States v.
Alvarez, 626 F.2d 208, 211 (1st Cir. 1980); Rutledge v. Wainwright, 625 F.2d 1200, 1204-05 (5th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1033 (1981).
_
41. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 55-60 (1970) (Harlan; J., concurring); United
States v. Easter, 539 F.2d 663, 665-66 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434·U.S. 844 (1977); Kinnel
v. Kansas, 509 F. Supp. 1248, 1253 (D. Kan. 1981); United States ex rel Watson v.
Mazurkiewicz, 326 F. Supp. 622 (E.D. Pa. 1971), qffd sub nom. Unite!I States ex rel Watson v.
Lindsey, 461 F.2d 922 (3d Cir. 1972); People v. Ibarra, 60 Cal. 2d 4~ 386 P.2d 487, 34 Cal.
Rptr. 863 (1963).
._
42. See Pinnell v. Cauthron, 540 F.2d 938 (8th Cir. 1976); Finer, supra note 39, at 1098100; Columbia Note, supra note 38, at 1079-83.
43. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493
(1976) (''We adhere to the view that [deterrence of unconstitutional p~lice conduct and inculcation of fourth amendment ideals] support the implementation of t!:te exclusionary rule at
trial and its enforcement on direct appeal of state-court convictions."); Israel, Criminal Procedure, the Burger Court, and the Legacy of the Wallen Court, 15 MICH. L. REV. 1319, 1404-15
(1977); Seidman, supra note 19, at 452-53.
Nevertheless, there has been movement toward adopting a "good faith" exception to the
exclusionary rule. In United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980) (en bane), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981), the Fifth Circuit held that evidence acquired through police
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Ohio 44 requires exclusion of illegally seized evidence at these stages

of the criminal justice process. Courts must look to the strength of a
fourth amendment argument in these contexts when evaluating ineffectiveness claims. Whether a petitioner may raise the search and
seizure issue in habeas corpus proceedings is irrelevant; that question
depends not on the merits of his fourth amendment claim, but on
whether he had an opportunity for full and fair litigation in state
court. The LiPuma approach, · by failing to distinguish the two
claims, extends Stone without considering whether that extension effectuates the goals of the Supreme Court.
A practical distinction between fourth and sixth amendment
claims militates against extending Stone. Justice Powell argued that
the remoteness of collateral proceedings from police activity diminished the exclusionary rule's deterrent effect; the rule's functional
justification suffered accordingly. 45 In the sixth amendment context,
however, remoteness may have beneficial rather than detrimental
ramifications. State trial judges may be reluctant to "soil the reputations" of attorneys who practice before them frequently by branding
their work "ineffective."46 Subsequent review in a separate federal
conduct taken with a "reasonable, good-faith belief that it was proper'' is admissible notwithstanding its illegality. 622 F.2d at 846-47. See generally Ball, Good Faith and the• Fourth
Amendment: Tlte "Reasonable" Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 69 J. CRIM, L. & CRIMI·
NOLOGY 635 (1978). Several other courts have indicated their approval of the Williams rule or
some variation on it. See, e.g., Virgin Islands v. Rasool, 657 F.2d 582, 593-96 (3d Cir. 1981)
(Adams, J., concurring); United States v. Nolan, 530 F. Supp. 386, 398 (W.D. Pa. 1981); State
v. Mincey, 636 P.2d 637, 648-51 (Ariz. 1981) (en bane); People v. Pierce, 88 Ill. App. 3d 1095,
1102, 1110, 411 N.E.2d 295, 301, 307 (1980); Richmond v. Commonwealth, No. 80-Ca-1366MR (Ky. Ct. App. July 31, 1981); State v. Lehnen, 403 So. 2d 683 (La. 1981) (dictum); People
v. Adams, 53 N.Y.2d 1, 10, 422 N.E.2d 537, 541, 439 N.Y.S.2d 877, 881 (1981); Green v. State,
615 S.W.2d 700, 709-13 (fex. Crim. App. 1981) (McCormick, J., dissenting); Holloman v.
Commonwealth, 221 Va. 947,949,275 S.E.2d 620,622 (1981) (by implication); Jessee v. State,
640 P.2d 56, 66-67 (Wyo. 1982) (Thomas, J., concurring). Moreover, in an article severely
critical of Williams, two commentators concluded that a majority of the Supreme Court, including Justice O'Connor, favor some form of a good faith exception. See Mertens & Wasserstrom, Foreword: Tlte Good Faith Exception lo the Exclusionary Rule: .Deregulating the Police
and .Derailing the Law, 70 GEO. LJ. 365, 370-71 & n.32 (1981).
In addition to these judicial developments, several legislative efforts seek the same result,
One bill, currently pending in Congress, includes a provision that would prohibit suppression
of evidence in federal criminal proceedings unless the law enforcement official intentionally or
substantially violated the fourth amendment. See S. 101, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., § 3505(a), 127
CONG. REc. Sl54 (daily ed. Jan. 15, 1981). Courts will determine if violations are "substantial" by considering the deterrent effect of suppression, the extent of the invasion of privacy,
whether the violation was reckless, and whether, but for the violation, the evidence would have
been discovered. S. IOI,§ 3505(b). In addition, the Colorado legislature has enacted a form of
the good faith exception while similar bills are pending in Montana and California. See Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra, at 369-70 n.29.
44. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
45. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493-94 (1976).
46. See Bazelon, supra note 39, at 822. The more general question of the relative competence of state and federal courts in adjudicating federal constitutional claims is a matter of
dispute among commentators. Compare Aldisert; Judicial Expansion ofFederal Jurisdiction: A
Federal Judge's Thoughts on Section 1983, Comity and the Federal Caseload, 1972 LAW & Soc.
ORD. 557, 559, and Lay, supra note 29, at 716, with Brennan, Some Aspects ofFederalism, 39
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forum may thus offer more effective implementation of the right to
adequate counsel.47
Nevertheless, several judges48 and commentators49 have expressed concern for the breadth of habeas review and have suggested
that Stone might appropriately be extended to other constitutional
claims.so One judge has expressed fear that Stone will be "swept
aside" if federal courts freely review the sixth amendment claims
that this Note considers. st The next section examines Stone more
closely and concludes that, rather than undermining the decision,
federal habeas review of the sixth amendment claims is fully consistent with its rationale.

B. The Importance

of Effective Assistance of Counsel

The Stone Court limited the availability of habeas corpus relief
for fourth amendment violations because it believed that the social
costs of excluding reliable evidence outweighed any additional deterrence that might be gained52 and because it was concerned that
the federal collateral review of state criminal trials was overbroad.s3
But the Court did sanction de novo review when the petitioner had
no opportunity for full and fair litigation in the state courts.54 "On
N.Y.U. L. REv. 945, 948 (1964), and Neubome, The Myth ofParity, 90 HARV. L. REv. llOS
(1977). The Supreme Court has refused to recognize a distinction between the competence of
state and federal courts. See Allen v. Mccurry, 449 U.S. 90, 105 (1980); Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465, 493-94 n.35 (1976). See generally Note, Beyond Custody: Expanding Collateral Review of State Convictions, 14 U. MlcH. J. L. REF. 465, 470-72 (1981).
41. C:f. Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 563 (1979) ("Federal habeas review is necessary to
ensure that constitutional defects in the state judiciary's grand jury selection procedure are not
overlooked by the very state judges who operated that system. There is strong reason to believe
that federal review would indeed reveal flaws not appreciated by state judges perhaps too close
to the day-to-day operation of their system to be able properly to evaluate claims that the
system is defective.").
48. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 259-61 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring); Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 232-42 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting); Brown v.
Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 536-37 & n.8 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring); Sallie v. North Carolina,
587 F.2d 636, 641-42 (4th Cir. 1978) (Chapman, J., concurring); Friendly, supra note 2, at 14344; Lay, supra note 29, at 704.
49. See, e.g., Bator, supra note 2, at 441-62; Doub, The Case Against Modem Federal
Habeas Corpus, 51 A.B.A.J. 323 (1971); Miller & Shepherd, New Looks al an Ancient Writ:
Habeas Corpus Reexamined 9 U. RICH. L. REv. 49, 79-86 (1974); Weick, Apportionment ofthe
Judicial Resources in Criminal Cases: Should Habeas Corpus be Eliminated?, 21 DE PAULL.
REv. 740 (1942); Note, Relieving the Habeas Corpus Burden: A Jurisdictional Remedy, 63 IOWA
L. REv. 392 (1977).
SO. See Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 587-88 n.10 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring in judgment); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 336-37 n.9 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 414 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring); Brewer, 430 U.S.
at 426-29 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
51. Sallie v. North Carolina, 587 F.2d 636, 641 (4th Cir. 1978) (Chapman, J., concurring).
52. See notes 15-24 supra and accompanying text.
53. See notes 28-31 supra and accompanying text.
54. See notes 26-27 supra and accompanying text.
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its face," one commentator has observed, "this qualification is puzzling."55 The costs of excluding reliable and probative evidence are
the same regardless of whether the petitioner had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his claim. And "[s]ince the state court's putative
denial of an opportunity for a fair hearing occurs after the fourth
amendment violation has taken place, it is hard to see how that denial has any impact at all on the deterrent efficacy of the rule." 56 To
the extent that a complete prohibition on review of fourth amendment claims would have further limited the availability of federal
habeas corpus, the full and fair hearing qualification ensures that
Stone incompletely safeguards the Court's expressed concerns for
finality in criminal trials, comity, and manageable federal caseloads.
The qualification is not, however, wholly inexplicable. Stone reaffirmed the availability of the exclusionary rule at trial and required
states to provide an opportunity to litigate fourth amendment claims.
To guarantee defendants this minimum level of procedural fairness,
the Court authorized federal habeas courts to review these claims
when the state procedures were inadequate. 57 The "opportunity for
55. Seidman, supra note 19, at 456. Professor Seidman continues:
Surely [the full and fair hearing qualification] makes little sense if one reads Stone as
establishing the discernment of factual guilt or innocence as a core value. The exclusionary rule is quite obviously equally truth-denying whether or not the defendant has had an
opportunity to litigate his fourth amendment claim in state court. But the qualification is
not easily comprehensible even if one reads Slone • • • as resting on a judgment regarding the utility of the exclusionary rule in different contexts.
Id Bui cf. Boyte, Federal Habeas Corpus After Stone v. Powell: A Remedy Onlyfar the Arguably Innocent?, ll U. Rica. L. RBv. 291,316 (1977) (Stone standard ''necessary to avoid total
frustration of even the minimal deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule").
56. Seidman, supra note 19, at 456.
To be sure, if a state had a consistent policy of declining to enforce the rule on direct
review, that policy might seriously detract from the rule's deterrent impact and so necessitate federal intervention. But the Slone Court nowhere suggests that a defendant must
demonstrate such a policy to justify habeas review. Taken at face value, the Court seems
to be saying that the mere isolated failure of the state court to provide an opportunity for
a hearing in the defendant's case is sufficient to support federal habeas intervention.
Id. (emphasis in original).
57. The Court failed to explain fully the meaning of "opportunity for full and fair litigation," providing instead a "cf' reference to Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963). Stone v.
Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 n.36 (1976). Townsend established criteria for determining when
federal courts should hold evidentiary hearings in habeas corpus proceedings. Sec 312 U.S. at
313. Most lower federal courts, however, have declined to make Townsend the "sole measure"
of Stone's standard. See, e.g., Palmigiano v. Houle, 618 F.2d 877, 881 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 901 (1980); Sanders v. Oliver, 611 F.2d 804, 807 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 827 (1980); Mack v. Cupp, 564 F.2d 898, 901 (9th Cir. 1977); O'Berry v. Wainwright, 546
F.2d 1204, 1211-12 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 911 (1977). Nevertheless, although factual
and procedural variations make generalizations difficult, the contours of "opportunity for full
and fair litigation" have become more apparent in several respects. First, habeas petitioners
are not entitled to "correct" resolutions of constitutional issues as determined by federal
courts. See Palmigiano v. Houle, 618 F.2d at 882-83; United Sfates ex rel Maxey v. Morris,
591 F.2d 386, 389 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 912 (1979); Swicegood v. Alabama, 577 F.2d
1322, 1334 (5th Cir. 1978). Bui cf. Gamble v. Oklahoma, 583 F.2d 1161, 1164-65 (10th Cir.
1978) ("fair'' opportunity includes ''recognition and at least colorable application of the correct
Fourth Amendment constitutional standards."). Indeed, in Slone itself, and in Wo!lf v. Rice,
its companion case, Federal Courts of Appeals had found constitutional violations. See notes
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full and fair litigation" standard is thus best explained as reflecting
the Court's traditional insistence 9n a minimum core of procedural
rights without which defendants cannot be fairly tried. 58
10-14 supra and accompanying text. Second, courts generally find that an accused's failure to
pursue state review or comply with state procedural prerequisites to such review does not
establish the absence of an "opportunity for full and fair litigation." See, e.g., United States ex
rel Maxey y. Morris, 591 F.2d at 389-91; Doleman v. Muncy, 579 F.2d 1258, 1265 (4th Cir.
1978); Caver v. Alabama, 577 F.2d 1188, 1191-92 (5th Cir. 1978); Gates v. Henderson, 568
F.2d 830, 837 (2d Cir. 1977) (en bane), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1038 (1978). But see Sanders v.
Oliver, 611 F.2d 804, 808 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 827 (1980) (Stone "opportunity" includes procedural opportunity to raise claim and a "full and fair" hearing); Dunn v.
Rose, 504 F. Supp. 1333, 1335-38 (M.D. Tenn. 1981). See generally <;:omment, Habeas Corpus
After Stone v. Powell: The "Opportunity for Full and Fair Litigation" Standard, 13 HARv.
C.R.-C.L. L. R.E.v. 521 (1978); Note, The "Opportunity" Test ef Stone v. Powell: Toward a
Redefinition efFederal Habeas Corpus, 23 VILL. L. R.E.v. 1095 (1978); Comment, .Development
ef Federal Habeas Corpus Since Stone v. Powell, 1979 WIS. L. R.E.v. 1145.
Courts have provided differing signals regarding the role of counsel error and post-Stone
review of fourth amendment claims. In Gates the court held that a mere procedural opportunity would not invoke the Stone bar where an ''unconscionable breakdown" in the state's
processes had occurred. 568 F.2d at 840. The Third Circuit, applying the caveat, has indicated
that an inadvertent but justifiable error by an apparently competent attorney that time-barred
a suppression hearing denies a defendant an "opportunity for full and fair litigation." Boyd v.
Mintz, 631 F.2d 247 (3d Cir. 1980). Counsel error rising to constitutional proportion would
seem a fortiori to entitle a habeas petitioner to federal collateral review. See generally Strazzella, Indfective Assistance efCounsel Claims: New Uses, New Problems, 19 Aruz. L. R.E.v. 433,
480-82 (1977). On the other hand, the principles illuminating Stone adopted by the Fifth Circuit suggest a contrary inclination. In Caver v. Alabama, 577 F.2d 1188, 1192-93 (5th Cir.
1978), the court asserted that it is ''the existence of state processes allowing an opportunity for
full and fair litigation of fourth amendment claims, rather than a defendant's use of those
processes, that serves the policies underlying the exclusionary rule" and justifies Stone. Williams v. Brown, 609 F.2d 216, 220 (5th Cir. 1980). The Williams court went further, holding
that a state court's refusal to hear the defendant's argument on the erroneous belief that it had
already been litigated in prior state proceedings did not allow federal habeas review. 609 F.2d
. at 220. "[l]n the absence of allegations that the processes provided by a state to fully and fairly
litigate fourth amendment claims are routinely or systematically applied in such a way as to
prevent the actual litigation of fourth amendment claims," Stone requires foreclosure of federal habeas corpus. 609 F.2d at 220 (emphasis added). Under the Williams analysis, specific
instances of attorney error seem no more likely to warrant habeas review than an error by a
state court. While this Note contends that sixth amendment claims evidenced by fourth
amendment errors are beyond Stone's reach, the arguments leading to that conclusion, see
notes 54-58 and accompanying text, also suggest that a defendant has not received an "opportunity for full and fair litigation" when represented by counsel whose performance falls below
constitutional standards.
58. q: Seidman, supra note 19, at 456-59 (concluding that "[t]he 'full and fair hearing'
qualification is a direct outgrowth of Professor Bator's insistence that the central role for
habeas corpus is not to assure that federal questions are correctly decided, but to assure that
they are decided by procedures calculated to reach a correct decision."). The Court has explicitly distinguished ''those rights that protect a fair criminal trial (from] the right guaranteed
under the Fourth Amendment." Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 241 (1973). A fair
trial includes the right to a lawyer, see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), who furnishes "adequate legal assistance," Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344 (1980); see Engle v.
Isaac, 50 U.S.L.W. 4376, 4383 (U.S. Apr. 5, 1982), the right to a speedy trial, see Barker v.
Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972); the right to a jury trial, see Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145
(1968), the right to confront hostile witnesses, see Barber v. :Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968), and the
right to be free from double jeopardy, see Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957). See
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 237-38.
Professor Bator has characterized federal habeas corpus as a vehicle for policing ''the integrity of the processes" by which state courts convict defendants to ensure ''full and fair litigation." Bator, supra note 2, at 458-59. Admittedly, Professor Bator qualifi.ed this proposition by
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The Court has always recognized that "the Constitution guarantees [certain rights] to a criminal defendant in order to preserve a fair
trial."59 The sixth amendment right to counsel occupies a prominent
position among those basic rights. 60 "Of all the rights that an accused person has, the right to be represented by counsel is by far the
most pervasive, for it affects his ability to assert any other rights he
may have."61 The right to counsel, moreover, includes the right to
effective legal assistance. 62 Writing for the majority in Cuyler v. Sullivan,63 Justice Powell unequivocally asserted that states may not
conduct "trials at which persons who face incarceration must defend
themselves without adequate legal assistance."64
Justice Powell's majority opinions in Stone and Cuyler contain
complementary themes. Notwithstanding its limit on a defendant's
procedural arsenal, Stone mandates concern for the fairness of state
trials. Cuyler indicates that effective legal representation is essential
to that end. Accordingly, any sixth amendment claim, including one
arising from incompetent handling of a fourth amendment issue, implicates the fairness of state proceedings - an interest entirely consistent with Stone and one that the federal courts should continue to
review. Indeed, because federal courts can no longer fully review the
merits of state court rulings, a habeas court should be especially concerned with the quality of a defendant's representation during the
recognizing that state courts and the Supreme Court on direct review could perform the same
function. Yet this assertion seems to ignore the Court's inability to review adequately federal
claims denied in state proceedings, see Hart, supra note 2, at 96; Stolz, Federal Review ofStale
Court .Decisions ofFederal Questions: The Needfar Additional Appel/ale Capacity, 64 CAL. L.
REv. 943, 950-59 (1976); Tushnet, supra note 22, at 492-96; .Developments, supra note 2, at
1061; cf. Boag v. MacDougall, 50 U.S.L.W. 3539, 3539 (Jan. 12, 1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (Supreme Court's decisions to accept cases should not be influenced by the merits of
particular cases); SO U.S.L.W. at 3539 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (the Supreme Court is not a
forum for the correction of error), a problem which federal habeas corpus ameliorates. See
Mishkin, Foreword· The High Court, The Great Writ, and the .Due Process of Time and Law,
The Supreme Court, 1964 Term, 79 HAR.v. L. REv. 56, 86-87 (1965); Wright & Sofaer, Federal
Habeas Corpusfar Stale Prisoners: The A/location ofFact-Finding Responsibility, 75 YALB L.J.
895, 897 (1966).
59. Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218,237 (1973). In Schneckloth, the Court distinguished the strict ''knowing and intelligent waiver" standard required for these fundamental
trial rights, such as the right to counsel, from the lesser "consent" standard required to authorize a police search.
60. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
61. Schaefer, Federalism and Slate Criminal Procedure, 70 HAR.v. L. REv. I, 8 (1956), See
Kamisar, The Right lo Counsel and the Fourteenth Amendment: A .Dialogue on The Most Pervasive Righi ofan Accused, 30 U. Cm. L. REv. 1 (1962). The adversary system is premised on the
availability of competent defense counsel See Schwarzer, .Dealing wltlt Incompetent Counsel
-The Trial Judge's Role, 93 HAR.v. L. REv. 633, 636-38 (1980).
62. See, e.g., Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344 (1980) ("inadequate assistance does not
satisfy the Sixth Amendment right to counsel"); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770-71
& n.14 (1970); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67-73 (1932).
63. 446 U.S. 335 (1980).
64. 446 U.S. at 344.
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"main event" - the state trial.65
C. The Relevance of Guilt or Innocence
Because evidence excluded from a criminal trial on fourth
amendment grounds is "typically reliable," the Stone Court argued,
"[a]pplication of the [exclusionary] rule . . . often frees the
guilty."66 The Court's opinion in Stone was based, in part, on its
reluctance to use habeas corpus relief to intrude on the guilt determination process in pursuit of fourth amendment values.67 Some commentators have interpreted Stone to mean that only claims alleging
constitutional violations that affect the determination of a defendant's factual guilt or innocence should be fully cognizable in federal
habeas corpus proceedings.68 If a habeas challenge alleges a claim
that does not go to the defendant's underlying guilt or innocence,
habeas corpus would be unavailable unless there had been no opportunity for full and fair litigation in the state courts.69 But a majority
of the Court has rejected this reading of Stone, and application of
the "guilt-related" model of habeas corpus is inconsistent with the
Court's opinions in the effectiveness of counsel area.
Although one can find support for a guilt-innocence distinction
in Justice Brennan's dissent in Stone,70 Professor Seidman has
demonstrated persuasively that "Justice Brennan mischaracterizes
the majority approach when he accuses it of reducing constitutional
requirements to 'mere utilitarian tools,' designed solely to separate
guilty from innocent defendants." 71 The Court, moreover, appears
to have rejected the guilt-innocence distinction originally drawn by
Justice Powell in Schneckloth v. Bustamante .72 InRose v. Mitchell, 73
the habeas petitioner alleged racial discrimination in the selection of
the grand jury that had indicted him. Since the petitioner had been
65. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977).
66. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 490 (1976).
67. 428 U.S. at 489-96.
68. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 467, 515-33 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Cover & Aleinikoff,
supra note 4, at 1086-100; Robbins & Sanders, supra note 2, 69-71; Rosenberg, Jettisoning Fay
v. Noia· Procedural Defaults hy Reasonably Incompetent Counsel, 62 MINN. L. R.Ev. 341, 383
& n.186 (1978); Tague, supra note 4, at 49-52. But see Boyte, supra note 55, at 297-306; Seidman, supra note 19, at 449-59. See generally Note, Guilt, Innocence and Federalism in Habeas
Corpus, 65 CORNELL L. R.Ev. 1123 (1980).
69. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 266 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
70. 428 U.S. at 515-24 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
71. Seidman, supra note 19, at 453. See note 55 supra.
72. 412 U.S. 218, 266 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring):
Where there is no constitutional claim bearing on innocence, the inquiry of the federal
court on habeas review of a state prisoner's Fourth Amendment claim should be confined
solely to the question whether the defendant was provided a fair opportunity in the state
courts to raise and have adjudicated the Fourth Amendment claim.
73. 443 U.S. 545 (1979).
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found guilty by a properly chosen petit jury and had been afforded a
full opportunity to litigate his discrimination clai,m in state court,

Justice Powell believed that Stone. barred collateral review. 74 Although the petitioner's claim "had nothing to do with his innocence,"75 a majority of the Court disagreed with Justice Powell's
reading of Stone and held that equal protection challenges remained
fully cognizable in federal habeas proceedings.76 The Court believed that federal review was necessary because the state trial system itself, rather than the police department, was alleged to have
violated the defendant's rights. 77
Rose stressed the special nature of equal protection claims, but its
rationale also applies to ineffectiveness claims. In Cuyler v. Sullivan,18 the Court permitted full habeas review of the sixth amendment claim and never mentioned Stone as a possible limitation. The
Court held that:
[u]nless a defendant charged with a serious offense has counsel able to
invoke the procedural and substantive safeguards that distinguish our
system of justice, a serious risk of injustice infects the trial itself. When
a State obtains a criminal conviction through such a trial, it is the Stale
that unconstitutionally deprives the defendant of his liberty. 19

Because allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel implicate the
fairness of the state trial proceedings, Rose suggests that full federal
habeas review of these claims should remain available. 80
74. 443 U.S. at 579, 587 n.10 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment).
75. Seidman, supra note 19, at 454.
76. 443 U. S. at 559-64.
77. 443 U.S. at 561-64.
78. 446 U.S. 335 (1980).
79. 446 U.S. at 343 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
80. The Supreme Court's concern that ineffective counsel might also undermine the guiltdetermining process predates its opinion in Stone v• .Powell In McMann v. .Ricltardson, 397
U.S. 159 (1970), decided six years before Stone, the Court held that a defendant could not
attack the constitutionality of his own guilty plea in federal habeas proceedings by asserting
that the plea was induced by a prior coerced confession. 397 U.S. at 771. But it added a
significant caveat. After noting the role of counsel's advice in pleading decisions, the Court
indicated that the guilty pleas would have been reviewable if the petitioner had alleged that his
lawyer's advice fell outside of ''the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal
cases." 397 U.S. at 771. See Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 266-69 (1973). McMann thus
premised its restriction of a state prisoner's access to collateral review on the assumption that
he had received the assistance of reasonably competent counsel McMann provides important
guidance for courts considering ineffectiveness allegations grounded on mishandled fourth
amendment claims. Cf. Westen, Away From Waiver: A .Rationalefar tlte Foifeiture of Constitutional .Rights in Criminal .Procedure, 15 MICH. L. REV. 1214, 1235-36 (1977) (state has greater
interest in finality of convictions in guilty plea cases than those secured by trial). Like Stone v•
.Powell, it significantly impaired access to federal habeas relief. Stone, like McMann, should
be interpreted to rest on an assumption of legal representation consonant with constitutional
standards.
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CONCLUSION

In Stone v. Powell, the Supreme Court identified the substantial
societal costs and diminished benefits that result when federal courts
impose the exclusionary rule in habeas corpus proceedings. Consequently, the Court restricted habeas relief in the fourth amendment
area to cases where a state had failed to provide the defendant an
"opportunity for full and fair litigation." At least one federal court
has applied Stone when a habeas petitioner alleged a denial of his
sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel because his
attorney did not competently object to introduction of illegally acquired evidence.
This extention of Stone is unwarranted. Courts should not confuse evidence of an attorney's incompetence - the fourth amendment error - with the underlying claim. The limit on collateral
review of exclusionary rule claims is irrelevant in assessing the conduct of an attorney who failed to assert competently the search and
seizure issue at trial. Free review of this sixth amendment claim,
moreover, will not create a loophole in Stone. Instead of precluding
all review of fourth amendment claims, the Stone Court preserved
the right to habeas corpus when necessary to protect the defendant's
opportunity to litigate his claims fully and fairly in the state courts.
The Stone majority thus evinced its fundamental concern for a core
of procedural rights that ultimately defines a fair trial. Effective
assistance of counsel is essential to that end. 81 Review of sixth
amendment claims, rather than undermining Stone, is fully consistent with the values that generated its rule.

81. The right to effective assistance of counsel could be termed a "truth-furthering right"
one ''that foster[s) sound guilt/innocence determinations with the requisite degree of certainty," Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 28, at 1092 (distinguishing such rights from truthobstructing and truth-neutral rights), and thus deserving of greater protection than the fourth
amendment right at issue in Stone.
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